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Owen Barfield
Un-Regressed Pilgrim
Edwin Woodruff Tait
This paper will use C. S. Lewis‟s The Pilgrim’s Regress to compare Lewis‟s
understanding of the spiritual life with that of Owen Barfield. I will argue that the
eponymous “regress” reflects Lewis‟s belief (post-conversion) that the imagination did
indeed point to truth, but that this truth could not be reached by the imagination directly
but only by a humble submission to the eternal truth of historic, orthodox Christianity.
Barfield, on the other hand, continued to believe that one could (using the terms of the
Regress) sail directly to the Island in the West without returning to the “Landlord‟s
Castle.”
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Owen Barfield: Un-Regressed Pilgrim
Edwin Woodruff Tait, Huntington University
A great deal of ink has been spilled attempting to answer the question: Why did
C. S. Lewis not become a Roman Catholic?1 But as far as I know, no one has yet
attempted to ask the question: Why did C. S. Lewis not become an anthroposophist? This
paper is not an attempt to answer that question, but I do want to begin by addressing the
question of why the question has not been asked.
Consider the following set of biographical facts about Lewis:
Having abandoned the Christian faith as a teenager, he was horrified to discover
in his twenties that one of his closest friends belonged to a religious tradition that he
regarded as dangerous and superstitious. Nonetheless, he could not deny the wisdom and
good moral character of this friend, and eventually came to acknowledge a good deal of
truth in his beliefs.2 Indeed, this friendship played a major role in his movement from
atheism through pantheism to Christian theism, finally including a belief in the
Incarnation. And yet, contrary to what one might expect, he drew the line at embracing
his friend‟s beliefs entirely, instead returning to a more mature and sophisticated version
of his childhood Anglicanism. His friend was often known to express regret and
puzzlement that Lewis failed to appreciate the claims of a religious tradition that had
turned out (by Lewis‟s own admission) to get so many things right.
All the above applies to Lewis‟s relationship with the Roman Catholic J. R. R.
Tolkien. But it also applies, in every detail, to Lewis‟s relationship with Owen Barfield.
Furthermore, just as Lewis had many other Roman Catholic friends and correspondents
in the course of his life,3 so Lewis‟s anthroposophical friends included not only Barfield
but several others, chiefly Cecil Harwood and his wife Daphne. Cecil Harwood and
Barfield were the executors of Lewis‟s will,4 and Lewis several times referred to what he
regarded as a great improvement in Daphne‟s character as evidence that anthroposophy
couldn‟t be entirely bad.5 Anthroposophy was not just a fad experienced by some of
Lewis‟s friends in the 20s—it was a constant presence in Lewis‟s life through his
enduring friendship with Barfield and the Harwoods. Barfield in particular continued to
insist that his own insights derived from his anthroposophy, and to marvel at Lewis‟s
refusal to give anthroposophy due credit.6
Why then has Lewis‟s parallel “failure” to become Roman Catholic attracted so
much attention? The flippant and superficial answer is that there are not very many
anthroposophists, and there are a lot of Roman Catholics. But of course it isn‟t hard to
find better reasons why it is natural for “merely Christian” admirers of Lewis, let alone
those who are Roman Catholics themselves, to see Lewis‟s friendships with Roman
Catholics as more intellectually significant than Lewis‟s friendships with
anthroposophists. By any reasonable standard, Roman Catholicism is at least as orthodox
an expression of Christianity as Anglicanism.7 From a “mere Christian” perspective,
Roman Catholicism is at the very worst a large and important expression of the central
Christian tradition. And of course there are good reasons, persuasive to many wise and
holy people, for thinking it to be a good deal more than that—for thinking it to be not
merely “Roman” but simply Catholic, and for questioning whether “mere Christianity” is
really an adequate expression of orthodoxy at all.

Anthroposophy, on the other hand, is by its own admission a heretical expression
of Christianity, and would be regarded by many Christians as not genuinely Christian at
all. The movement‟s founder, Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925),8 was an Austro-Hungarian
philosopher and mystic influenced both by the German Romantic tradition and by his
own alleged experiences of other worlds and spiritual beings. The central claim of
anthroposophy, which was immensely important for Barfield‟s thought, was that the
physical world experienced by humans is neither wholly objective nor wholly subjective,9
but what Barfield would call an “appearance”—a “participated” reality shaped by human
perception but not simply a private illusion. A further claim of anthroposophy—again of
crucial importance for Barfield—was that the Eastern religious experience of union with
Brahman and the Western consciousness of individuality represented two sides of human
consciousness, neither of which could healthily exist without the other. Steiner‟s thought
was both Christocentric and Eurocentric, arguing that the Incarnation of the Logos in
Jesus was the fulcrum of human history, marking the point at which a true “ego” first
appeared in human experience and paving the way for the development of individual
selfhood in Western civilization. In the modern world, however, Steiner believed that
Western human beings had become cut off from their own inner world and from the
world around them (in Steiner‟s thought, this amounts to the same thing, since humans
are connected to everything else through their own inwardness). This led to the
domination of modern Western thought by the spirit of “Ahriman”—the demonic force
representing materialism (corresponding to “Lucifer”—the demonic force representing
pure spirituality disdainful of matter and of the necessities of human evolution).
Barfield came to anthroposophy in 1923 through his interest in Romanticism,
particularly Coleridge. In his own accounts of Steiner‟s thought and career, Barfield
consistently emphasized the importance of Steiner‟s early work editing Goethe‟s
scientific writings (more conventional anthroposophical accounts stress instead Steiner‟s
own spiritual experiences as the source of his ideas). Barfield‟s most concise and typical
description of anthroposophy, found in the title of one of his collections of essays, was
“Romanticism come of age,” and he claimed in one of the essays in that volume that all
of Steiner‟s thought was a development of Goethe‟s ideas.10
In 1926, when Lewis and Barfield began the extended argument which Lewis
dubbed “The Great War” in his autobiography, Barfield‟s acquaintance with Steiner‟s
work was, by his later estimate, quite limited.11 Indeed, at one point in the course of the
Great War Lewis suggested that Barfield had come to believe in Steiner‟s ideas owing to
a lack of philosophical education and a reaction against the “trivial reasoning” of the
modern world. Now that Barfield (under Lewis‟s tutelage?) understands better the power
of “good reasoning” (by which Lewis seems to mean Idealist philosophy), he should not
need Steiner any longer.12 Of course, Barfield disagreed with this, and only became a
more enthusiastic and profound disciple of Steiner as the years passed.13 Since Barfield
claimed that his thought did not appreciably change over the years,14 I will summarize the
main points of Barfield‟s mature position here before returning to the “Great War” and its
relevance for the development of Lewis‟s thought during and after his conversion.15
According to Barfield, human beings once “participated” in the phenomena
surrounding them without any clear sense of existing apart from these phenomena. This
“original participation” is, in Barfield‟s categorization, identical with ancient paganism.16
Pagans “peopled” the world with gods and spirits not in a clumsy prefiguration of

scientific explanation, but because they were incapable of seeing the phenomena as dead,
purely material realities standing over against the living human observer. Instead, they
saw the phenomena as manifestations of living beings “of the same nature” as
themselves.17 This “original participation” was, in Barfield‟s view, broken in two ways:
partially and gradually by the rise of logical thinking among the Greeks,18 and
dramatically and totally by the monotheistic faith of the ancient Hebrews.19 The latter
paved the way for the Incarnation of the Logos, an event which Barfield, like Steiner,
regarded as central for the history of human consciousness.20 Both Hebrew and Greek
culture pointed forward to this event, the “rebirth of images” inaugurating the era of
“final participation.”21 As Barfield defines it, “final participation” is the conscious choice
by the individual to see the world not as a dead, purely material reality external to the
self, but as a “collective conscious” in which all human beings participate.22 Whereas
original participation was centered in the external world (the “gods” and “spirits”
understood to lie “on the other side of” the phenomena”), final participation will be
centered on human beings (“Christ living within me”).23
Unfortunately, Barfield believed, the Incarnation of the Logos was not received
by those most thoroughly prepared to receive it (the Jews). The crucifixion of Jesus
indicated that the path from original to final participation would not be smooth and
“gentle” but would involve the catastrophic loss of participation—a time of “idolatry” in
which the phenomena would cease to be seen as living realities participated in by the
observer, and would be regarded as dead things to be dissected and manipulated by the
newly self-conscious human beings.24 This loss of participation, while rooted in the
growth of logical thought among the pre-Christian Greeks, first became noticeable in the
Renaissance and gained steam with the Scientific Revolution. Western humans became
conscious of themselves as individuals standing not only over against the external world
but over against their own experiencing selves.25 Again, as with the crucifixion of Jesus,
Barfield suggests that this loss was not inevitable—that the path might have been
smoother. He explicitly compares this “missed opportunity” leading to the loss of
participation to the “felix peccatum Adae” in Augustine‟s thought.26 Overcoming the
consequences of this loss—bridging the chasm between our experiencing, conscious
selves and the world of phenomena—was, Barfield thought, the task facing the modern
world.
At the time of the “Great War” in the late 1920s, Barfield was expressing these
ideas in a less systematic way. Indeed, the key point made in Saving the Appearances and
elsewhere, that what people usually call “the real world” is a construction based on our
perceptions, is first found on Lewis‟s side of the debate, as part of an attempt to convince
Barfield of the naiveté of his reliance on intuition.27 Barfield would eventually make this
basic epistemological point a centerpiece of his mature view of the world. I am always
inclined to be suspicious of the claim that any thinker does not change or develop
(especially when made in the first person, as in Barfield‟s case), but it does appear to be
true (to my limited observation so far) that Barfield‟s later thought consisted of the
defense and elaboration of the basic intuitions present in the “Great War” debate.
The basic claim defended by Barfield and criticized by Lewis in the “Great War”
was that imagination was a source of truth. Lewis initially attacked not the claim itself so
much as the connection between imaginative truth and propositional truth. Lewis
maintained an agnostic stance with regard to the possibility of an ineffable “truth”

perceivable by the imagination in moments of inspiration. But he insisted that any
propositional claims made after the moment of inspiration had subsided must be judged
on their own terms and not taken on trust on the basis of the supposed ineffable truth
perceived in the moment itself.28 In support of this, he pointed to his own imaginative
experience, which he argued led him at different times to completely opposite
conclusions: leaving him, for instance, “sometimes convinced of the insignificance of the
human spirit in the scheme of things, and sometimes of its divinity as lord of space and
time and creator of all that it seems to be enslaved to.”29
The initial disagreement thus turned out to be whether “truth” should be defined
primarily in propositional terms (as an accusative plus an infinitive, in Lewis‟s
formulation), or whether, as Barfield claimed, “truth” was “reality itself taking the form
of human consciousness.”30 (Lewis responded that Barfield defined “the real” as
whatever bits of his experience he happened to like.31) For Barfield, truth in this sense—
human experience of reality--was an ever-changing “torrent,” and the propositional truth
beloved of Lewis was inevitably an inadequate cross-section of that torrent.
Eventually the controversy took the form of treatises (written in homage to
medieval scholasticism) written by each of the participants in an exercise book and
passed back and forth from one to the other (this book was acquired by Ed Brown and
exists in the C. S. Lewis and Friends Collection here at Taylor). At this stage Lewis
expounded his metaphysical system, which was that of “Subjective Idealism” as taught
by the English Hegelians. (This view is described in Surprised by Joy as the “New Look”
and appears in The Pilgrim’s Regress as the teaching of “Mr. Wisdom.”)32 According to
this philosophy, ultimate reality consists of “Spirit,” which is conscious of itself in the
form of individual human minds. The individual is thus both a limited, mortal being
bound up in a physical body and, at the same time, the infinite, immortal mind which
knows no limits and no death. When the individual dies, the immortal mind “relapses”
into the state of pure Spirit. Subjectively, this is extinction, but on this theory our
subjective experience of limitation and mortality is essentially illusion.
Lewis found Samuel Alexander‟s Space, Time, and Deity invaluable in
developing his understanding of the relationship between limited human beings and
infinite Spirit. Alexander distinguished between “enjoyment” and “contemplation.” In
any mental act, Alexander argued, there is the act itself, which is “enjoyed” (i.e., directly
participated by the subject), and the object, which is “contemplated.” So, for instance,
right now I am enjoying the act of speaking and am contemplating the Great War. Just
before I got up to speak, I was contemplating the act of speaking about the Great War,
and enjoying apprehensions as to whether you would all think I‟m an idiot. Lewis
maintained—and never changed his mind as far as I know—that you could not do the two
things at once, though you could flicker back and forth between them so fast that they
might appear simultaneous.33 Lewis used the distinction in a number of ways throughout
his career—recall Screwtape‟s advice to Wormwood to make sure that the patient
“enjoyed” sinful thoughts while contemplating the object of anger or lust, but
“contemplated” virtuous thoughts, which would make it impossible for him to “enjoy”
them.34 In the “Great War,” Lewis deployed this distinction in defense of his idealist
metaphysics. “Spirit” can be enjoyed but never contemplated. (The famous first stanza of
the Tao Te Ching appears to be saying something very similar, at least in one
interpretation.)35 The mature, Christian Lewis would express this conviction in terms of

God‟s transcendence as the sovereign Creator, of whom even mental images are
essentially idolatrous (if one forgets their limited and tentative nature for an instant). But
the Lewis of the “Great War” used this same conviction to reject any conception of a
divine reality that could be experienced directly.
A further disagreement between the two concerned the law of non-contradiction.
Lewis showed himself (here as in his later career as a Christian apologist) prone to sharp
either/or dichotomies, which he presented as logically inevitable. Recall that Lewis
rejected the idea that truth could be derived from imaginative experience based on the
supposedly incompatible judgments derived from that experience. As Barfield pointed
out, these judgments (the “greatness” versus the “insignificance” of the human spirit, for
instance) were so vague and general as to be almost meaningless. Similarly, Lewis found
Alexander‟s enjoyment-contemplation distinction convincing, while Barfield mocked it
as “Box and Cox.”36 At this point in his career, Barfield was groping toward what he
would later describe as the concept of “polarity”—that reality often consists of two
apparently incompatible poles each of which in fact includes the other. Barfield argued
that even logical propositions were rooted in an act of what he called “esemplastic
imagination.”37 Without the imagination, logic becomes mere tautology. One define a
hippopotamus as an animal that has pink intestines, but only by imagination can we look
at such an animal and say “this is a hippopotamus.”
The intensity of the “Great War” should not blind us to the basic convictions the
two men already shared. Both rejected a purely materialistic conception of reality. Both
believed that human consciousness was in some way the means through which Spirit
expressed itself. Lewis admitted to Daphne Harwood in 1933 that on the main point
where he and Barfield differed—whether there was a supernatural world that human
beings could experience—Barfield had been right and he had been wrong.38 The Great
War came to an abrupt end in part, it appears, because Lewis‟s movement toward
Christianity caused him to lose confidence in the primary point he had been
maintaining—the either/or relationship between mortal human experience and the divine
reality of Spirit. Barfield‟s attempts to interest Lewis in further discussion of these points
were rebuffed, and there the matter rested.39 In later speeches, essays, and interviews,
Barfield speculated a good deal concerning the relationship of Lewis‟s later thought to
the issues raised in the Great War. Since Lewis did not do this directly, the
“conversation” has been rather one-sided. Any attempt to get at Lewis‟s side of the story
suffers from the varied and possibly contradictory nature of the evidence.40 The only
work I am aware of in which Lewis directly addressed the issues of the Great War was
the essay “Bluspels and Flalanspheres,” published in 1939 as part of the volume
Rehabilitations.41 In this essay, Lewis declared that he was a “rationalist” who did not
believe that the imagination was a vehicle of truth, but only a condition for it—the
position he had maintained in the “Great War” (though obviously he had changed his
mind on other aspects of the debate).42 However, the early date of the essay means that
we cannot be sure that Lewis did not change his mind later on. Unfortunately, the later
evidence is indirect, and comes from Lewis‟s imaginative work. Peter Schakel has argued
that Lewis‟s fantasy writing of the 50s and 60s shows that he had come to agree with
Barfield on the role of the imagination as a source of truth.43 Whether that is true or not is
not the task of this paper to determine. Rather, in the time remaining, I wish to examine
Lewis‟s first fictional work as a Christian, The Pilgrim’s Regress, published in 1933. This

was the same year in which Lewis told Daphne Harwood that Barfield had been right on
the central question of supernatural reality, and six years before the publication of
“Bluspels and Flalansferes.” Thus, we are dealing in this work with a Lewis who was
clearly a Christian but just as clearly did not yet agree that imagination was a direct
source of truth, whether or not he came to do so later.
For those unfamiliar with this early work by Lewis: Pilgrim’s Regress is the story
of a young man named John, brought up in Puritania, a land shadowed by the fear of the
Landlord at whose sufferance all the inhabitants live. (Puritania appears to be a caricature
of Victorian/Edwardian Protestantism—Lewis took umbrage at the suggestion by Sheed
and Ward that this represented his own upbringing, but this was surely a reasonable
inference).44 The Landlord may choose to turn them out at any time, and his relations
with the tenants are governed by a set of arbitrary Rules whose content seems impossible
to determine exactly. The Landlord‟s castle, a place of terror where the tenants go when
their lease expires, sits on a range of forbidding mountains to the east. John flees from
Puritania (and the Landlord) in search of an Island he has seen in the West in fleeting and
occasional visions.45 He is delighted to be told by “Mr. Enlightenment” that the Landlord
doesn‟t really exist, but this knowledge brings him no nearer to the Island.46 After a series
of adventures representing various aspects of post-Enlightenment Western reductionism
(a degraded form of romantic poetry leading to sensuality, avant-garde poetry that mocks
the very idea of beauty, Freudian analysis which imprisons John briefly before he is freed
by Reason, etc.), John and his traveling companion Vertue (who is motivated by a selfimposed sense of duty rather than by John‟s “sweet desire”) arrive at a deep chasm in the
earth. They encounter an old lady called “Mother Kirk” who informs them that the chasm
is called “Peccatum Adae,” and that only she can carry them across.47 Seeking an
alternative to submission to Mother Kirk, John and Vertue travel first north (encountering
various aspects of what Lewis saw as the “hardness” and cruelty of early-twentiethcentury though, including a cruel caricature of T.S. Eliot and the literally chilling “Mr.
Savage,” representing various forms of totalitarian violence), and then a short way to the
south, of the main road. By this time Vertue has become sick and John has to carry him.
John seeks help and healing for his friend at the house of Mr. Wisdom, who tells him that
the land on the other side of the chasm (including the Island) is not simply a figment of
his imagination but also does not “exist” in a way that would enable him to reach it. (This
is the Subjective Idealism Lewis had defended in the Great War.)48 Mr. Wisdom‟s
teachings, while noble and beautiful, do not satisfy even his own children, and John and
Vertue interpret them in diametrically different ways.49 (Here we see Lewis‟s continuing
concern for logical consistency and his impatience with paradox or Barfieldian
“polarity.”) Vertue flees the house of Mr. Wisdom and climbs into the mountains to
purify his flesh of the taint of mortality, while John follows out of sheer loyalty to his
friend (even though he interprets Mr. Wisdom‟s teachings in a much more optimistic
way), having been warned by a mysterious “Man” that the two of them must keep
together. 50
Separated from Vertue, John finds refuge at the cave of a hermit named “Father
History,” who proceeds to instruct him (John, like a true modern, knows almost no
history) in the history of the “country” in which he lives.51 Father History informs John
that there are two ways by which the Landlord makes himself known—the “Rules” John
had known in a degraded and confused form in Puritania, and a series of “pictures” which

the Landlord smuggled into regions controlled by the Enemy (who kept his subjects
illiterate, making the Rules useless). The illiterate people who depend on pictures rather
than Rules are known as “Pagans,” while the only nation who could read was (originally)
the “Shepherd People.” John dislikes the Shepherd People intensely, but Father History
tells him that their “narrowness” was necessary in order to preserve the precious
knowledge they had been given.52 Father History identifies John as a Pagan, in spite of
his Puritanian origin, and identifies the “Island” with the pictures sent to the Pagans by
the Landlord. History describes two major groups of Pictures sent by the Landlord in
relatively recent times: pictures of a Lady (i.e., courtly love) and pictures of the landscape
itself (Romanticism).53 While the Pictures cannot be defeated or prevented by the Enemy,
they always become corrupted eventually (leading to a new set of Pictures being sent by
the Landlord). The only way out of this endless cycle is through the Rules, and for John
personally the only way to find what he seeks is to be united to Vertue by the Landlord‟s
Son, the same, Father History tells him, who united the Pagans and the Shepherds.
I have gone into some detail here, because Barfield claimed to have been told by
Lewis that he, Barfield, was Father History. Lionel Adey understands this to be a
criticism of Barfield, since the other figures John has encountered represent “erroneous
ideas.” But this is far from clear in the case of Father History. Clearly his teachings are
inadequate, by themselves, to get John across the chasm. But they point him in the right
place—to the “Landlord‟s Son.” And they do help him get across the chasm indirectlyFather History‟s talk of the Landlord and the Rules so terrifies John that he flees the cave,
encounters Reason who challenges him to a duel, and in flight from her encounters Death
itself. Death tells John that it is he whom John has been fleeing all the time, and that the
only way to escape Death is to die. Finally surrendering, John climbs down the cliffs and
entrusts himself to Mother Kirk, along with Vertue, who has preceded him. They fling
themselves into the water and reach the other side.54
This, however, is not the end of the story. After being instructed inside the
mountain on the other side of the chasm, John and Vertue journey to the seacoast, where
they expect to board a ship for the Island. But it turns out that the world is round (though
very small, apparently)—the Island is simply the promontory on the far side of the
mountains on which the Landlord‟s castle sits. Fear and desire—Rules and Pictures—the
demands of the law and the lure of beauty—turn out to be the same thing. With a new
sobriety and courage, John travels back across the ground he has traveled, together with
Vertue and an angelic guide. He sees the country with new (and more austere) eyes. The
house of Wisdom turns out to be Limbo, and the choices to both sides of the main road
are much more limited, and much more horrifying, than it had appeared on the outbound
journey. (One particular character, Mr. Sensible—contended worldliness—turns out not
to exist at all.) The book ends with John in sight of the Landlord‟s Castle, at the
surprising end of his pilgrimage.55
What does this remarkable (if not particularly successful) book tell us about
Lewis‟s attitude to the issues of the Great War? To begin with, the identification of
Father History with Barfield should not be pushed too far. Barfield‟s memory of just
what Lewis said appeared to be quite vague, and Lewis may have exaggerated in order to
honor his friend. Father History‟s story, after all, terrifies John because it points him back
toward the Landlord of his youth and humble obedience to the Landlord‟s Rules. But
Barfield consistently criticized Lewis for his emphasis on moralism and on humble

submission to a transcendent God, and Lewis‟s primary criticism of anthroposophy in the
1933 letter to Daphne Harwood is its lack of belief in such a transcendent Creator.56 At
the same time, Father History‟s account of the role of the “Shepherd People” and the
Rules does sound a great deal like Barfield‟s later account of the “withdrawal from
participation” in ancient Hebrew culture, in contrast to the “original participation” of
paganism. Father History‟s account of the various sets of pictures sent down by the
Landlord could be interpreted as a kind of “history of consciousness”—and yet not really,
because there doesn‟t appear to be any progress from one set to another.57 Rather, as in
Lewis‟s mature thought, the action of God in history is presented in terms of preservation
against the persistent tug of the Enemy‟s corruption. Perhaps the best way to interpret
Father History is as a summary of what Lewis thought he had learned from Barfield—
which may not have been what Barfield intended to teach.
Other parallels between Regress and Barfield include the attacks on reductionistic
materialism (including the hilarious exchange between John and Mr. Enlightenment, in
which the latter explains that anthropologists have explained away stories about the
Landlord as garbled reports based on sightings of animals escaped from a zoo),58 and the
“via media” between two demonic extremes (though for Lewis the extremes are different
than for Barfield, and Steiner comes in for fairly mild criticism as a son of Mr. Wisdom
who has been dining nocturnally with the southern magicians).59 But perhaps the most
striking and moving echo of Barfield in Regress is the sequence after John escapes from
Father History‟s Cave. Death‟s warning to “die before you die,” and John‟s agonized
decision to plunge into the [baptismal] waters, echo an essay by Barfield on “Death”
recently published for the first time in VII.60 This posthumous essay appears to date from
around 1930—Lewis reported having read it at that time, and described it as worthy of a
disciple of George MacDonald. (Indeed, it is possible that what I find to be echoes of
Barfield in this section of Regress are really echoes of MacDonald, but certainly the
similarity between Regress and Barfield‟s essay shows the profound spiritual kinship
between Lewis and Barfield after Lewis‟s conversion.) These parallels are all the more
interesting because Barfield was resolutely one of the “once-born,” with little use for
sudden conversions or breaks, and insisted in his later remarks on Lewis that Lewis‟s
conversion really wasn‟t as sudden as Lewis suggested. Barfield himself, he reported, had
“just [gone] along steadily feeling more and more certain of some things.”61
The major difference between Barfield and the Lewis of the Regress lies in the
eponymous Regress itself. While Barfield believed that what is commonly called
“nostalgia” (Goethe‟s Sehnsucht, Lewis‟s “Joy” or “Sweet Desire”) is the most precious
thing in human life, he believed that this always leads on, not back. For Barfield, as the
early “Great War” letters show, truth is reality in human consciousness and thus always
involves a temporal dimension. Any abstract, propositional statement may be true at one
point in the evolution of consciousness and false in another. Furthermore, while Barfield
believed that propositional logic is “either meaningless or inadequate” when it attempts to
describe Reality, he believed that the human faculty of imagination was adequate to grasp
reality, if properly trained and nurtured.62 Hence he lacked the genuine apophaticism that
made the pre-conversion Lewis vehemently deny the possibility of “getting to the other
side of the chasm,” and the post-conversion Lewis insist over and over that God is the
Great Iconoclast.63 To suggest that even the human imagination could simply lead
onward and upward to an ever fuller representation of divine reality would be, for Lewis,

not only presumptuous but ungrateful. The terror of his conversion stemmed from the
recognition that the Island was in fact the Landlord‟s Castle. No doubt Lewis‟s sense of
filial guilt with regard to his recently deceased father played a role (though I don‟t want
to engage in Freudian reductionism) in his conviction that his newfound faith in God
committed him to return to a renewed and enriched version of the religion of his
childhood. Tolkien found this infuriating; the more placid Barfield found it puzzling and
frustrating. But for Lewis (whatever psychological factors may have shaped him) this
decision flowed naturally from his essentially Platonist view of the world (according to
which whatever is true is true timelessly), his horror of chronological snobbery (learned,
ironically, from “Father History” aka Barfield), his deep dislike of the modern world and
the trendy fashions of his own generation, and most of all his awareness of that deep
chasm in the earth called Peccatum Adae. While Barfield could compare the loss of
participation to the sin of Adam, they are not the same thing. The former occurs relatively
late in human history and can be transcended by the evolution of consciousness. The Fall
of Adam as Lewis and orthodox Christianity understand it occurs at the beginning of
human history, is located in the will more fundamentally than in the intellect, and can be
overcome not through evolution but only through repentance and return.
Barfield‟s simultaneous kinship with and difference from Lewis make him a
worthy subject for study by Lewis‟s admirers (even apart from the intrinsic appeal of
Barfield‟s thought and personality). Barfield and Lewis shared many of the same
concerns, and this allows them to serve as foils for each other. They shared the same
quest for a Western island glimpsed in the fantasies of boyish imagination, and
continuing to guide their respective pilgrimages throughout their lives. But at that chasm
called Peccatum Adae their ways converge. Where Lewis turned back to the neglected
(and often distorted) truths of his childhood faith, Barfield, like one of Tolkien‟s elves,
took ship for the West on a vessel compounded of Romantic poetry and German
occultism, and propelled by the slow-burning furnace of his peculiar imagination.
Whether he made landfall, and on what shores, is open to question and is ultimately
beyond our ken. But the quest that he and Lewis shared ought to be our quest too, and we
owe it to him to take the alternative he offers seriously, if only for the sake of the man
who claimed to have learned so much for him, even as he took, in the end, a different
way to the same goal.
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